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LUDWIG BÜCHNER: NINETEENTH CENTURY ATHEIST
By Edward Jayne
October 5, 2018

Mostly forgotten today, the German physician and philosopher, Ludwig
Büchner (1824-99), made a significant contribution to the theory of materialism in
the mid- nineteenth century from an atheistic perspective. Described by Engels
and others as a “vulgar” materialist, he was nevertheless unsurpassed in having
linked science and atheism unfettered by irrelevant considerations. The son of a
doctor who served as president of the local medical college, Büchner studied at
four universities culminating with the University of Vienna. In 1852 he became a
lecturer in medicine at the University of Tübingen with every expectation of
pursuing an academic career. However, he was forcibly retired in 1855 because
of the publication that year of his first book, Force and Matter [Kraft und Stoff], and
he spent the rest of his career as a physician in Darmstadt as well as the author of
close to a dozen additional books that explored in depth numerous scientific
advances in the nineteenth century. Other titles by Büchner include Nature and
Spirit [Natur und Geist (1857)], Man in the Past, Present, and Future [Die Stellung des
Menschen in der Natur (1869)], The Idea of God [Der Gottesbegriff und desen
Bedeutung in der Gegenwart (1874)], and as his final testament the collection of his
essays published during the 1890s, Last Word on Materialism and Kindred Subjects,
trans. By Joseph McCabe (1901).
Büchner’s firsteffort , Force and Matter (hereafter cited as F&M), was by far
the most influential of his works, having been reprinted in twenty-one editions
over his lifetime in his effort to keep apace with mounting scientific advances
during the second half of the nineteenth century. Unlike Herschel’s seminal
history of science published in England, A Preliminary Discourse on the Study of
Natural Philosophy, published twenty-five years earlier, which was followed by
comparable scientific histories by Whewell and Jevons among others, Büchner
addressed a variety of religious and philosophical issues relevant to the major
scientific advances he was explaining. As indicated in his Preface to the 1884
edition, he also specifically devoted two chapters to religion with a focus on
cultural variations across the world as told by contemporary anthropologists,
and he gradually expanded his approach among disciplines and sub-disciplines
to include discoveries in cell structure, spectral analysis, the conservation of
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energy, chemical synthesis, the transmutation of forces, the anthropological
consequences of evolution, and the neurological resemblance between primates
and human beings.
Büchner’s lucidity in dealing with complicated issues at a sophisticated
level of analysis undoubtedly benefited from his reaction against the Kantian
perspective that had dominated German discourse just a couple decades earlier.
Repelled by both Kant and the post-Kantians, he went out of his way to ridicule
their elaborate obscurity, for example declaring, “The philosophical mist which
enshrouds the writings of learned men seems rather . . . to hide than to reveal
thoughts.” [F&M, pp. vii-viii] In a later passage, he declared with obvious irony
upon having identified Kant by name, “Philosophers are wonderful people. The
less they understand of a thing, the more words they make over it.” By
implication such authors were no less encumbered by their ignorance than their
readers. Büchner also quoted Spiller about metaphysicians “bringing the
simplest things into the most boundless confusion,” as well as Helvetius about
metaphysicians’ “deluge of words poured over a desert of ideas,” and
Schopenhauer about a “mill clattering right enough, but without any meal”
[F&M, pp. 257-58] Büchner especially despised orthodox belief, but he also
overlooked the arguable clarity of Kant and Hegel’s prose when they shifted
their attention to scientific matters, reinforcing his suspicion that their use of
obscurity was intentional.
Unavoidably, Büchner’s compensatory effort to make scientific findings
plain somewhat diminished the permanent value of his analysis in light of new
and more advanced discoveries. Most notable was his neglect of recent theory
relevant to such fields as metabolism and electro-magnetism, the latter in light of
Maxwell’s remarkable breakthrough as early as 1865. Nevertheless, Büchner’s
ability to summarize the broad range of mid-nineteenth century scientific
innovations was unique, and with few exceptions the discoveries and theories
that escaped his attention—including Maxwell’s discoveries--would only have
further substantiated the validity of his principal assumptions. Most of what he
said helped to clarify science at a new level of understanding on a strictly
materialistic basis, and in this light it remains valid even today.
In his first nine chapters, as promised by the title of his book, Form and
Matter, Büchner focused on the two basic scientific laws, the conservation of
matter as first proposed by Lavoisier in 1789 and the conservation of force as first
proposed by Mayer and Helmholtz in approximately 1842. In his two chapters
upon matter, Büchner declared a perfect vacuum to be impossible, estimated the
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density of gas or vapor to consist of at least twenty-one trillion parts per cubic
centimeter of gas, and he took the liberty of comparing the density of stars within
galaxies with that of atoms within solid things. He additionally calculated the
location of the sun in the Milky Way, estimated that the distance of Sirius, the
closest and most brilliant star in heaven, to be more than a million times as far
away as the sun is from the earth, and he favorably quoted Rückert relevant to
the ancient assumption of Melissus that “The world has neither beginning nor
end, in space nor in time. Accordingly, everywhere is centre and turning-point,
and in a moment is eternity.” [F&M, p. 45] Büchner also argued as earlier
maintained by Aristotle that matter “is in motion everywhere and is full of most
active life,” and he proposed the risky hylozoic principle that “the spirit can only
exist on a substratum of organized matter” and has no independent spirit
outside matter, [F&M, pp. 52, 55]
In his chapter on motion, Büchner declared his acceptance of d’Holbach’s
argument suggestive of Heraclitus as well as Aristotle: “The world is nothing
more than matter and motion and an endless concatenation of causes and effect.
Everything in the universe is in constant flow and change, and all rest but
apparent.” Büchner accordingly argued, “All matter, as far as we can ascertain,
is ever in movement, not merely in masses,” and that “all the conditions of
matter . . . are modes of motion.” He even went so far as to quote from an early
paper by Friedrich Engels the bold assertion, “motion is the mode of existence of
matter,” a thesis that can be seen in retrospect to have had economic as well as
physical implications. [F&M, p. 59] On this basis, Büchner argued, “Rest is not an
incapacity for motion, but only as the resistance between two equal and opposite
motions.” [F&M, 60] The specific cause of motion he accordingly assigned to
heat, a concept first anticipated by the early Greek philosopher Anaximander,
and the concept of circular motion first anticipated by Heraclitus:
Heat must be regarded as the sole moving principle in the constant
rotation of energies, without the presence of which a state of equilibrium
would long since have been reached and therewith universal rigidity have
set in. [F&M, p. 62]
All in all, he argued without any sense of contradiction, “Motion is as
indestructible, as incapable of annihilation as force and matter; it assumes other
forms, other appearances, of which the new forms are equivalent to those from
which they have arisen.” [F&M, p. 64]
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The more basic question that posed itself was the possibility—indeed the
likelihood--of a basic interaction between the two physical principles of matter
and force, the latter providing the source of motion. In later editions Büchner
began the very first chapter of his text in its later editions by quoting as many as
eleven scientists concerned about such a possibility. For example:
•

Force is no impelling god, no entity separate from the material
substratum; it is inseparable from matter, is one of its eternal indwelling
properties. [Moleschott]

•

Fundamentally, as is readily seen, there exists neither force nor matter.
Both are abstractions of things, such as they are, looked at from different
standpoints. They complete and presuppose each other. [DuboisReymond]

•

Force without matter is not a reality, and both by their union have made
the world and all its phenomena. Without matter no force, without force
no phenomenon, also without matter no phenomenon. [Spiller]

And most simply:
•

We know of no matter which does not possess force, and on the other
hand, we know of no forces which are not joined to matter.” [Haeckel]
[F&M, pp. 1-2]

Büchner proposed three possible explanations for this linkage: (1) the theistic
notion that force and matter are two wholly distinct phenomena created by God;
(2) the materialist notion of force as kind of an imponderable matter; and (3) the
more recent materialist notion of “unity and inseparability” implicit in Aristotle’s
cosmology, such that “wherever matter is found, there must also be force in a
state of motion, tension and resistance, and vice versa.” [F&M, 11-12] Büchner
supported the third and most recent assumption and extended its application to
the analysis of heat, light, and magnetism. On the other hand, he took for
granted the assumption that any concept of nature is simply wrong that features
one without taking into account the others, and he used this argument to
challenge Christianity’s version of creationism:
The conception of an inactive creative force without any real existence
beside itself [i.e. God preceding creation] is as impossible as that of Force
without Matter. If however an original chaos is supposed, into which at a
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given time the creative force introduced order and reason, then is the idea
of creation as such given up, and we come back to the eternity of the
universe, which . . . excludes or renders superfluous any creative or
regulating principle. [F&M, 8]
If force and matter across the universe bear a constant relationship that survives
every permutation, Büchner argued, they are infinite as argued by Melissus in
ancient Greece, and therefore cannot have been created by any kind of a God:
If Matter and Force . . . are indestructible, and if there is no matter
without force, no force without matter—there can remain no doubt that
the universe was not created, that it was not called into life by some will
residing outside itself, but that it is eternal. [That which has neither
beginning nor end in time or space can have none in existence. That
which cannot be destroyed cannot have been created. [F&M, 10-11—see
also 14]
With greater brevity, Büchner asked, "How can that be created which cannot be
annihilated?" [F&M, 18]
What Büchner overlooked, as did his contemporaries, was the possibility
of a fourth explanation of force and matter, that the two are basically
interchangeable as suggested by Einstein’s famous equation, e = mc2, which
equates energy (i.e. force) with mass (i.e. matter) times “c square” i.e., the speed
of light times itself. Büchner also overlooked, as did his contemporaries, the
cosmic role of a “big bang” in providing the universe with a strictly “energetic”
beginning and with “black holes” that produce a no less enormous concentration
of matter ultimately the outcome of the big bang’s release of energy. But of
course this estimated 85 billion year cosmic lifespan might play a very small role
in an even bigger plenum identified as a multiverse containing many such
universes in similar progress from beginning to end. On such a grand scale,
God’s anthropomorphic role becomes absurd.
Büchner did concede the possibility of “evolution of the heaven itself,”
suggestive of Darwinian principles brought into play on a grand scale even
bigger and more inclusive than their geological and biological manifestation on
earth. [F&M, p. 114] However, as first suggested by Parmenides, he also rejected
the notion of a discernible beginning that could be identified as a first cause that
might justify the concept of creationism:
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The existence of the universe with its perfections and imperfections, with
its forever and ever interacting processes of development and reversion, is
a more possible and more intelligible conception than the theory of a
perfect self-conscious creative force springing from a reasonless Nothing. .
..
Büchner’s argument seems valid whether applied to the universe or to what is
now described as a multiverse. If Aristotle was able to accept the possibility of
infinitude, why can’t we?
Büchner also emphasized the importance of structure, or form, at all levels
of manifestation in nature:
There exists in Nature a tendency to form, which is the outcome of a
definite formula, and is so blind and so dependent upon casual external
circumstances, that it often gives birth to the most senseless and aimless
forms, that it is often incapable of surmounting or conquering the smallest
obstacle it meets in its way, and that it frequently obtains the very
opposite of the effect which it ought to obtain according to the laws of
reason or intelligence. [F&M, p. 84]
As to be expected, he accordingly emphasized the immutability of natural laws
on the categorical assumption that nothing whatsoever is accidental, miraculous,
or the result of chance. Without exception, he argued, all events in the universe
are entirely explicable in terms of physical laws:
Nothing can happen in the universe, be it the greatest or the least of
things, except by the influence and as the result of natural laws. Rigid
inexorable necessity rules the whole and the course of nature. [F&M, p. 75]
Everything accordingly takes place as the result of “stringent necessity,” and in
the words of Vogt quoted by Büchner, “The laws of Nature are rude unbending
forces which know nothing of morality nor of compassion.” What instead
prevails is a “tendency to form” resulting from “causal external circumstances.”
[84] Otherwise, the entire system falls apart. Necessarily supportive of such
uncompromising determinism is the total absence of miracles as explained by
Kepler: “For once miracles are admitted, every scientific explanation is out of the
question.” [85] The various unbreakable laws mentioned by Büchner included
those of light, heat, gravitation, electricity, magnetism, chemical affinity, and
even the process of thought as “condensed motion.” [F&M, pp. 90-102]
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In the realm of biology, Büchner took for granted the proposal of Robert
Remak and Carl Virchow in the mid-1850s that all life manifests itself as either
individual cells or combinations of cells:
The whole range of the simplest to the most complex forms, has been
made up of a single and very simple form-element and from its products,
the cell, and that this simple form, which consists of enclosure, contents,
and nucleus, arises again from a yet simpler compound of matter, viz. the
protoplasm or formative matter. [F&M, p. 70]
Moreover, Büchner identified carbon as the primary component of cells, a “semicoagulated, homogeneous form of larger or smaller bodies of albumen capable of
nutrition and reproduction.” [Ibid.] And he went so far as to describe the cell as
the organic counterpart to the crystal in the inorganic world. All life, he
suggested, can be traced to the preliminary existence of single-cells identified as
“protistas” as described in the research of Haeckel. [F&M, p. 71]
Büchner also mentioned the possibility of an extra-terrestrial source of life
as suggested by the discovery of “actual traces of plant and animal remains in
meteoric stones.” In this case, he proposed that the germs or first beginnings of
all living things very likely “existed from all eternity . . . and that they only
became capable of further development wherever the necessary conditions were
favorable to it.” [F&M, pp. 137, 134] He also supported what seemed the
scientifically respectable study of biogenesis in specific environments, and he
was even willing to propose the far more speculative hylozoic assumption that
all matter is “full of active life,” and “brings forth ever increasing vital and
intellectual forces by an ever higher and enhanced complexity of organic
compounds.” [F&M, p. 55] He explained that nature possesses a "tendency to
form" that produces intricate structures presumably including life itself. He
conceded that this tendency might be explained as the product of divine
intelligence, but argued that evolution as explained by Darwinism, for example,
has been “too slow, gradual, and wearisome” to suggest the role of any sort of
God in having brought it about. [F&M, p. 167]
In his three chapters upon evolution explained by an inevitable result of
“ceaseless mutual competition” both within and between species, Büchner
provided ample exemplification of the incessant, if sluggish, pace of biological
advances. [F&M, pp. 176-77] He explained that the full development of
advanced biological features such as the eye are the outcome of early functions
that serve the same purpose at a far more primitive level. In the case of the eye,
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he argued, the earliest process of sight as sensitivity to various shades of light is
performed by “small gatherings of red or violet pigment-cells, to be found in the
skin at the fore-part of the body.” [Ibid] Of course the evolution of different
functions has advanced at different rates and with different modifications.
Nevertheless, he argued, the biological ties among the species have been
demonstrated by their close resemblance in any number of ways. The most
striking of these, he suggested, are the structure and function of the brain among
primates—nearly the same except for variance in relative size. He also mentioned
the close resemblance among fetuses of various species whose differentiation
emerges at later stages of maturity. [F&M, pp. 162-63]
Büchner also went so far as to suggest the seemingly experimental impact
of evolution itself in creating a large variety of new mutations few of which have
survived. It was almost as if biology itself tried out new and seemingly random
variations to determine their adequacy relevant to survival:
If once we begin to look at Nature from the point of view of fitness, it is
easy not only to discover numbers of such aimless and useless things,
absurdities and imperfections, but also to demonstrate that Nature, when
interrupted in her blind action by external or internal difficulties, becomes
guilty of the most startling blunders and perversities. [p. 180]
The sometimes unfortunate result, he proposed, has been the emergence of a
large variety of species, many of which effectively survive with a “mischievous”
impact on the environment:
No one can deny that Nature, in her blind creative impulse, has given
birth to a number of beings and things which cannot be regarded as
designed for their own sake, and which rather destroy than promote the
natural order of things and the good of the whole. [Ibid.]
Büchner included reptiles, snakes, and the like in this category, and summarized
the futile effort of teleologists, metaphysicians, and others to explain away the
existence of such creatures in God’s universe. But of course no such excuse is
necessary in light of Darwinian evolution. Citing the predictions of Helmholtz
and others, Büchner more broadly predicted the eventual extinction of mankind,
indeed of all life, in the indefinite future based on astronomical calculations:
As there was once a period in which the earth was without organic life, so
there must be and shall appear also in the future which, so far as human
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conception goes, is as yet infinitely and immeasurably remote, a period in
which the present forces of Nature will become exhausted and be
consigned to temporary inactivity, through the constant loss of heat and
the gradual equilibrium of temperature; causing everything that lives on
earth to return to night, to death and oblivion. [F&M, p. 192—see also 171]
Büchner nevertheless declared his optimistic expectation that life can be expected
to occur elsewhere in the universe in a similar manner and under comparable
circumstances:
Nay, at the very time when our own race dies away in cold and
desolation, we have a right to assume that on thousands upon thousands
of other spots in the universe the conditions of things will have reached a
culmination point from which a new race can take its departure . . . [F&M,
p. 193]
Today Büchner’s prediction might seem commonplace aside from its suggestion
of a frozen global destiny as opposed to a hot one, and of course both options
remain possible, given the likelihood of sun’s expansion before its collapse in the
distant future. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, however, Büchner’s
proposal could only have shocked many of his readers.
In the second half of his book, Büchner provided an extended analysis of
the human mind, including spiritual issues presumably neglected by
materialists. Büchner speculated that the brain functions like an electric
telegraph, with myriad ganglionic centers constantly relaying impulses through
nerves that both generate electricity and serve as electric conductors. He also
argued that intelligence manifests the effectiveness of this telegraphic system,
and in fact that Carl Vogt's seemingly demeaning analogy is fully appropriate,
"As there is no bile without liver and no urine without kidneys, so there is no
thought without brain." [F&M, p. 246—also pp. 241, 235 and 245] Moreover,
Büchner declared, the brain is dependent upon its blood supply for neural
activity to occur, so once it is deprived of elements—e.g. oxygen--carried by
blood to the brain, mental activity stops and death quickly follows:
But when the severance takes place, the blood supply from the heart at
once comes to an end, and with it all consciousness--every function of the
brain, every psychical activity, and all life ceases. [F&M, p. 263]
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It may accordingly be deduced, he suggested, that all modes of consciousness,
whether described as idea, soul, or spirituality, are entirely a biological function
of the brain resulting from slow oxidization within brain cells through the
combustion of carbon and oxygen, both of which are supplied by blood. As such
human thought like all other mammalian consciousness is strictly a product of
metabolism, therefore derivative of nature:
A soul without a body, a spirit without physique, and a thought without
substance, can no more be realized or exist than electricity, magnetism,
undulations of heat, gravity, etc., can exist without those bodies or
materials by the activity of which the phenomena designated by those
names are produced. Innate ideas do not exist, and free will is almost
entirely an illusion. Like all other creatures in the animal kingdom,
mankind is a product of nature, since "not only what he is, but also what
he wants, does, feels and thinks, depends on purely natural
interconnections and on necessities of nature, like the whole fabric of the
universe. [F&M, pp. 317—also see p. 352]
In the simplest possible terms, soul consists of nothing more than the composite
interaction of mental processes relevant to the experience, memory, and feelings
imbedded in the brain’s neural circuitry kept active by its blood supply. It can be
noted here that Büchner did not refer more specifically to the elaborate network
of axons and dendrites needed for thought to occur.
Büchner also suggested that the level of metabolism in the human brain is
much higher than in the rest of the body. The average human brain weighs three
pounds and occupies between sixty-five and seventy cubic inches, just one
fortieth the size of the average human body. However, he estimated that it
actually consumes one-third of the entire body’s process of metabolism resulting
from the activity of its six hundred million to a billion ganglionic centers. [F&M,
p. 233] Current data suggests that only twenty percent of the body’s metabolism
occurs in the brain, but that between fifty and a hundred billion neurons are
involved. Nevertheless, the ratio emphasized by Büchner remains impressive
and obviously relevant to the differentiation between human and animal mental
capacity. With serendipity, he also suggested that this advantage of the human
brain as compared to the brains of other species might ultimately result from
erect posture, but he did not try to explore this possibility in depth.
Büchner also disclosed that based on every aspect of chemical and
biochemical analysis the human brain’s capabilities bear a close resemblance to
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those of the animal brain. As a result, he maintained, the advantage of human
intelligence is almost entirely a matter of relative size: “The difference existing
between human and animal souls is not a fundamental one, but only a question
of degree.” [F&M, p. 328] In a later context he repeated his thesis more
specifically relevant to this assumption:
Neither morphology, nor chemistry, nor macroscopy, nor microscopy is
capable of discovering an essential difference between the human and
animal brains; great though the differences may be, they are after all but
differences of degree. [F&M, p. 352]
With an average weight of only three pounds, Büchner argued, the human brain
is nevertheless bigger both on an absolute scale and relative to body weight as
compared to animals:
Whilst in man the weight of the brain amounts to from one-fiftieth to one
thirty-fifth part of the weight of the body, in the dolphin it amounts only
to the hundredth part, in the elephant to the five hundredth, and in the
whale to the three-thousandth part of the aggregate weight of their
respective bodies. [F&M, p. 210]
Quoting the French anatomist Leuret, Büchner suggested as an alternative that
the average weight of the brain compared to each ten thousand parts of the body
mass is 1.8 in fishes, 7.6 in reptiles, 42.2 in birds, 53.8 in mammals, and 277.8 in
human beings. [F&M, pp. 210-11, 220] As compared to the gorilla, the closest
genetic relative to humanity, he estimated that the human brain capacity
averages ninety cubic inches as compared to the gorilla’s brain capacity of thirtyfour cubic inches, little more than a third the size. [F&M, p. 222]
Elsewhere, Büchner did acknowledge additional factors such as strength,
development, and cooperation additional to size:
There is no intellectual capacity which belongs solely and exclusively to
man; it is only the greater strength and the higher development of these
capabilities, aided by their more perfect co-operation, which give him his
great and marvelous superiority over the brute. [F&M, p. 351]
Moreover, he disclosed that the pre-frontal region of the human brain, which is
heavily involved in cognitive activity, is more developed in humans as compared
to other regions of the brain, and that the human brain’s fissured convolutions of
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gray matter are deeper than those of animals, often producing as much as a 12-1
advantage in functional mass as compared to an entirely smooth brain. Also of
possible relevance, he suggested, are the levels of phosphorus and lecithin it
contains. [F&M, p. 217] Whatever the variables submitted to analysis, Büchner
maintained, the variation between human and animal intelligence can be treated
as primarily a question of degree, so the qualitative advantage of the human soul
turns out to be strictly quantitative. If the human soul is somehow immortal, the
animal soul might therefore be as well, given a larger brain.
The remarkable advantage of human intelligence cannot be discounted,
Büchner insisted, for it has made possible all the advances of the human species,
not least its ability to generate and sustain civilization. He declared with mock
eloquence, “Yea, the destiny of the whole human race is indissolubly bound up
in the sixty-five or seventy cubic inches of brain-mass, and the story of mankind
is recorded therein . . .” [F&M, p. 240]
Büchner was more generous in his attitude toward the concept of free will
than might have been expected. His initial epitaph quoted from Lavatar, “Man is
as free as a bird in a cage; he can move within certain limits,” conceded a modest
zone of behavioral freedom in an otherwise deterministic universe. Büchner
explained at greater length—
And thus it may be said without exaggeration that. . . all human actions
are everywhere dependent in the last resort on the fixed necessities of
nature or on external and internal influences, and that in each individual
instance there remains only a very small scope, and oftentimes no scope at
all, for free volition. [F&M, pp. 366-67]
His reference to a “very small scope” provided a tiny window of opportunity for
promoting the concept of free will, but he also cited the habitual predictability
seldom surmounted by mankind in general:
How often does it happen that a man knows himself and his mental and
peculiar characteristics sufficiently well to see what faults he is likely to
commit, and yet is unable to successfully resist this internal pressure. He
repeats the same faults over and over again and gets again and again into
the same scrapes; for it is quite an exception for the powers of imagination
and thought to gain the victory over a man’s perceptive faculties and
appetites. [F&M, p. 373]
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One assumes that the principle extends to the most trivial choices in life, for
example the seemingly random decisions that normally occur in card games or in
wandering through a grocery store. Even the effort to test or demonstrate one’s
free will by picking what seems an entirely new choice once again exemplifies
one’s predictability. As already suggested by Edgar Allen Poe, the “imp of
perversity” might seem entirely frivolous to those who exercise it, but to others
familiar with such individuals, their supposed unpredictability is altogether
predictable in light of their personalities.
Büchner included two chapters pertaining to religion, the first of them a
sweeping anthropological history of worship as practiced in a large variety of
primitive religions, and the second a comparative summary of various beliefs in
an afterlife. He declared his reluctance to discuss in depth any of the “biblical
myths and fairy tales,” since, he argued, they are—
. . . really too childish, too radically at variance with the most notorious
facts and results of the whole geological, archaeological and
archaeogeological science, to be made the subject of a serious
controversy.” [F&M, p. 197]
Stripped of anthropomorphic fantasies, he argued, the God concept is strictly a
primitive application of reason at each and every stage in its historic advance
from primitive superstition to the most advanced ventures in both theology and
its rejection. Ironically, godlessness occurs both at the most and least advanced
levels. At the very top of the heap in religious sophistication, he argued, are the
almost entirely godless religions of Confucius, Buddha, and Lao-Tse, the latter
having specifically identified the principle of Tao with universal reason. [F&M,
pp. 205-7] At the very bottom with no absolutely no belief in God, he included a
large assortment of primitive societies later investigated by Tyler, Lubbock,
Bradley, Hasskarl, and others. He also quoted Darwin’s authoritative
confirmation in Descent of Man:
There is ample evidence, adduced not by mere visitors, but by men who
have long resided among savages, that numerous races have existed, and
still exist, which have no idea of one or more Gods, and which have no
words in their languages to express such an idea. [F&M, p. 302]
Among societies in America devoid of religion, Büchner included Californian
and Brazilian Indians as well as the Abepoinas, Payaguas, and Grand-Chaco
tribes. Comparable African societies included the Oukanyama, the Lakkutas, the
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Bechuanas, Kaffirs, Hottentots, Bushmen, and Ovaheroro tribes. Among Pacific
tribes he included native Australians, Motus of New Guinea, Samoans, and the
Mincopis. [F&M, p. 302-10] Büchner also took into account the predictable
tendency in many primitive societies to emphasize either the role of a devil or
group of devils rather than God or some kind of a polytheistic compromise
pitting gods against devils. Unlike the monotheistic notion of a benevolent God
capable of anger, primitive worshippers had divided into friendly and hostile
gods, justifying their worship of one category (supportive) in order to protect
themselves from the other (hostile). As a more sophisticated sky-god religion, he
suggested, Christianity has been sufficiently flexible to accommodate both
versions, since many who believe in heaven also accept the existence of hell as an
underworld alternative. Recently in the United States, for example, ninety
percent of the population believed in God, whereas only seventy percent
believed in the devil. Organized religion seems to have no problem in straddling
this division among otherwise like-minded churchgoers.
The sky-God religious faiths promoted by Jews, Christians, and Moslems
have of course been situated between primitive belief and the sophisticated
beliefs of Buddhists and Confucians. Büchner did not bother to explore the
standard arguments used against religious belief, for example the multitude of
Biblical contradictions challenged by several generations of English deists as well
as Spinoza, Meslier, Voltaire, and Strauss, among others. It was almost as if
Büchner considered this particular level of assumptions no longer relevant to
philosophical discourse. However, he did devote a full chapter to rejecting the
hope and expectation of an afterlife as the empty pursuit of “personal
continuance.” Appropriately, his initial epigraph for the chapter was Pliny’s
memorable quote, “From the moment of death onwards, both the soul and body
feel as little as they did before birth.” Büchner went on to explain-A soul without a body, a spirit without physique, and a thought without
substance, can no more be realized or exist than electricity, magnetism,
undulations of heat, gravity, etc. can exist without those bodies or
materials by the activity of which the phenomena designated by those
names are produced. [F&M, pp, 316-17]
No supportive body, effectively no soul. Upon the death of body the soul returns
to oblivion from whence it came in the first place. Büchner was also dubious of
sophisticated metaphysical arguments that bypassed such issues obviously
vulnerable to challenge. For example he ridiculed the contemporary physicist

15
Fechner’s amateurish effort to justify Christianity based on what might be
described as metaphysical common sense:
God, the aggregation of being and action, has no universe external to
himself and no existence external and opposite to himself; he is the One
and the All; all spirits move within his spirit, and all bodies within his
body; he rotates wholly within himself, and is influenced by nothing from
without; nay he is influenced wholly by himself, and he himself, since he
embraces the basis of the influence of all existing within himself. [F&M,
pp. 314-15]
Somewhat reminiscent of Spinoza, Fechner’s pantheistic vision would seem to
have been harmless enough two hundred years later, but not for Büchner, who
declared with obvious disdain, “That sounds very beautiful, but nevertheless, if
we look at it more closely, we find that it is stupendous nonsense.” [Ibid]
Büchner also rejected vitalism, the pantheistic notion of “vital force” as a
supposedly transcendent power that supersedes the physical universe. He
explained, “life is no force, but a resultant or movement of particles grouped in a
definite order.” The “stuff” of organic life wholly derives from the inorganic
universe, and its components--necessarily atoms--are indestructible as can be
readily demonstrated by burning anything organic inclusive of flesh, “so that
nothing remains except the non-volatile ashes, and this without a single atom
being lost in the process.” [F&M, p. 339] Of course Büchner was unaware of the
full biological complexity of metabolism in light of modern scientific findings.
Initial discoveries about metabolism took place during the nineteenth century,
but it was only in the twentieth that its unique dynamics could be grasped,
especially with relevance to the discovery of DNA and RNA’s genetic roles.
Nevertheless, Büchner’s argument that the same number of atoms remains after
combustion continues to be valid with the important caveat that the compound
cannot be restored without renewing the complex participation of such biological
aspects as metabolism and genetics, which is of course impossible at that point.
And finally Büchner returned to the issue of ethics, challenging the
assumption essential to Kant’s metaphysics and almost entirely accepted by
society as a whole that religious belief is essential to morality. Quite the
contrary, Büchner argued, there has been no direct connection between the two
based on anthropological evidence:
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But in reality it is a fact that has long been placed beyond all doubt, that
morality and the church, nay morality and religion, are things perfectly
independent of each other, and that the most efficient agencies of morality
in the world are education, training, prosperity and freedom [F&M, p.
381]
Büchner insisted that anthropologists have conclusively demonstrated that social
customs, not religion, “first created morality.” Granted, religion can serve as an
effective agent supportive of social customs, but it has unfortunately too often
impeded rather than promoted this accomplishment by needlessly producing
conflict among competitive societies:
Religion counteracts morality and universal philanthropy in so far as it
sets men against each other by the diversity of doctrines and theories of
belief, thus fostering and nourishing the worst impulses of human nature.
[Also] it must not be forgotten that the moral precepts laid down by
religion are mostly antagonistic to human nature and therefore wholly
unpracticable. [F&M, p. 384]
Büchner’s suggestion that the most religious ages and nations “have not always
been the most moral” seems an understatement in light of Europe’s bloodthirsty
history that includes the Medieval Inquisition, the Crusades, the Spanish
occupation of the New World, and the Seventeenth Century religious wars. Even
today the inhabitants of the most aggressive and expansionistic nations almost
inevitably depend on false righteousness based on a toxic admixture of religion
and excessive patriotism. Granted, a small group of religious dissidents is often
publicized for opposing a particular war, but the great majority accept their
government’s propaganda on the remarkable assumption that God is either on
their side or at least willing to forgive their choice.
As for individual behavior, Büchner went so far as to insist on religion’s
basic immorality because of its dependence on threats and rewards to encourage
ethical behavior. He argued, “religion is injurious to morality, in so far as it
assigns to it an aim based upon egotism and self-seeking, whereas pure morality
finds, and ought to find its reward in itself . . .” [F&M, p. 383] In other words,
moralists who believe in God are more likely to engage in ethical behavior
because of their assumption that they will be repaid in heaven once they die
rather than being consigned to eternal perdition in hell. Such individuals might
perform good deeds simply because they want to, but if they also happen to
believe in just rewards during an afterlife this expectation cannot be disregarded.
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To this extent, Büchner argued, their generosity is “egotistical,” as opposed to the
willingness of benevolent atheists who perform good deeds strictly because they
seem appropriate relevant to human need without any rewards in mind. Such
individuals are the true moralists, Büchner maintained, not the seekers of
heavenly reparations, whatever their good deeds.
In his final chapter, “Concluding Observation,” Büchner once again
mentioned the abandonment of Kantian metaphysics and those who practice it
(“No one now speaks about them”) for the most part in light of “gigantic strides”
in science. At least five times he insisted on the crucial importance of science in
confirming the validity of atheism. Most simply he quoted Virchow to the effect
that philosophy “must walk on the path of natural science only,” and in support
of this thesis he cited Protagoras’s ancient declaration that man is the measure of
all things. Almost as an afterthought he concluded his book by taking into
account the recent trend in agnosticism popularized by the English evolutionist
Thomas Huxley, who claimed that religious issues can neither be confirmed nor
rejected and can accordingly can be ignored on this basis. As later explained by
logical positivists, Huxley identified the God concept as a “pseudo-issue” that
lets believers hold whatever belief they wish while giving secularists the freedom
to pursue their interests free of ideological obstruction. In effect agnosticism
served as a compromise that neutralized the choice between religion and its
rejection, just as Pyrrhonian skepticism had done twenty-three centuries earlier.
In partial accord with Huxley, Buchner was true to his commitment as an atheist
by rejecting agnosticism as an empty compromise unduly generous to believers:
If we look at things in open daylight, we find that the "Unknowable" of
modern Agnostics is nothing more than the good old God of the
theologians, who has already made his appearance in so many deceptive
disguises in the history of philosophy. . . . At the bottom of it we always
find the same anthropomorphic disfigurement, the same asylum
ignorantiae and the same vague being [God] which, being begotten of the
fear of the unknown, ruled of yore over the crude primeval man and will
continue to rule over the civilized man, until the sun of knowledge and
the recognition of a natural and self-contained order of the world shall
have made a reality of the Fiat lux! (Let there be light). [F&M, pp. 396-97]
Agnosticism’s “asylum in ignorance,” or, more specifically, its excuse based on
ignorance—the lame rationalization that one cannot be sure whether God exists
and therefore is justified in avoiding the issue—was in itself reprehensible in
Büchner’s opinion, since it helped to perpetuate the religious cause. Without
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quite recognizing his implications, Büchner thus brought his remarkable book to
a close with two principles—his defense of science as an unavoidable concern of
philosophy, coupled with his rejection of skepticism to the extent that it serves as
evasiveness and an unnecessary concession to religion.
Compiled almost as an afterthought, Büchner’s culminating book, Last
Words on Materialism, included thirty-one essays written during the final decade
of his life—also by chance the final decade of the nineteenth century. If Büchner
provided in Force and Matter a cumulative assessment of scientific trends earlier
in the century, Last Words served as an appendix summarizing their remarkable
secular implications as a major intellectual accomplishment setting the stage for
the twentieth century. Büchner argued in retrospect that he was not a crass
materialist as Engels had once argued (LW, p. 140), but strictly speaking a monist
insofar as he treated all phenomena without exception as particular aspects of the
physical universe without any supernatural input whatsoever. Like Aristotle, in
other words, he refused to speculate about its origins, willing to accept the
supposition that the total universe never had a beginning nor by implication a
creator who imposed such an event.
Büchner went so far as to declare that “existence is a fact, and that is all”
(LW, p. 152). He accordingly rejected metaphysical theories as being dualistic
somehow based on the distinction between mind and matter, spirit and the
physical universe, etc. as if the mind, like all animal intelligence, were not strictly
speaking a product of this universe. In his 1895 essay, “Science and
Metaphysics” he himself eluded the charges of binarism by identifying energy
with force (“what comes to the same thing,”), thereby permitting his notion of
the unity of force and matter as appropriately “the foundation of philosophic
monism.” [LW, pp. 111, 113] In effect he proposed that the two were
complementary manifestations of the universe in its entirety, not that he
recognized the possibility of their conversion from one to the other as based on
the principle of relativity later proposed by Einstein.
In his 1899 essay, “More about Philosophic Materialism,” (significantly,
the next-to-last essay in his book), Büchner went so far as to elevate monism to a
status superior to both materialism and spiritualism:
Whoever takes a one-sided view of matter may rightly be called a
“materialist.” Whoever, on the other hand, attributes everything to force
alone may rightly be called a spiritualist, idealist, or dynamist. Whoever
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regards both in their unity and association, and makes this unity the basis
of his thought, is a “monist.” (LW, p. 273]
By “force alone” he seems to have referred to ultimate cause. With ironic
generosity, he conceded the harmlessness of the God concept predicated on
intrinsic unity such as might be suggested by Spinoza’s pantheism, but he
insisted that such a notion becomes empty once reduced to this level of
generality:
It is possible that the two expressions, like the words “spirit” and
“matter,” represent only two different sides or phenomenal aspects of one
and the same thing, or source of all things, the inner nature of which is
unknown to us. If anyone wishes to call this “God, there is not much to be
said against it—provided it is stripped of its theological and
anthropomorphic associations, and not opposed to or set above the
principle of the uniformity of nature. [LW, p. 116]
Büchner also rejected the a priori status of thought as well as the concept of a
privileged but unknowable realm in the universe that totally eludes scientific
investigation as explained by misleading transcendental concepts, for example
the Kantian notion of the “Thing in itself,” the Hegelian version of “Idea”
derivative of Platonism, “Schopenhauer’s “Will” as an unspoken momentum of
the physical universe (for example in human instincts), Hartmann’s pre-Freudian
version of “Unconsciousness,” and most inclusively, Spencer’s concept of the
“Unknowable.” [LW, pp. 287-88, 148-9] All of these privileged realms of preexistence or extra-existence, Büchner insisted, illustrate what might be described
as an asylum ignorantiae, a higher (or lower) sanctuary of unavoidable ignorance
supposedly the result of our limited grasp of the universe.
In “Knowledge and Evolution,” his final essay written in 1899, Büchner
conceded that electricity, magnetism, and chemical affinity cannot be directly
experienced by the five senses, but defended advanced scientific methodology in
surmounting this limitation, and on this basis he insisted that “it is . . .
inconceivable or impossible that the world should be essentially other than as
man conceives it . . .” [LW, pp. 292-3] With Lockean confidence, he asserted—
Our sensations, moreover, which only become sense-perceptions and offer
material for further elaboration to the intelligence through the action of
the brain, are not, as we have seen, something complete in itself, and
independent of the outer world, but are in every case caused by very
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definite and very varied movements of the outer world—movements
which must have a definite and orderly relation for those which take place
within us. [LW, pp. 296-7]
In the simplest possible terms, what the brain perceives somehow manifests
existence and can be submitted to scientific analysis on that basis, and the
physical universe as perceived by the brain—inclusive of the brain itself--does
not possess any supernatural influence that eludes scientific investigation. In the
simplest possible terms, Lockean epistemology once again prevailed despite
Kant’s reinvention of metaphysics.
Büchner accordingly rejected the concept of vitalism promoted during the
late nineteenth century as an alternative version of monism dependent on a
“peculiar force which alone has the property of producing the vital phenomena”
(LW, p. 3) Obviously, some sort of a God concept was implied by this notion, but
Büchner was unwilling to explore such a possibility. Instead, he insisted that
there is no extraneous power that has invested the universe with life. Quite the
contrary, he asserted in “Science and Metaphysics,” also published in 1895, life
itself is strictly a product of the physical universe:
The circumstance that we do not know yet, or cannot demonstrate in what
way non-vital motion passes into vital, does not in the least impair the fact
that this conversion is purely natural, proceeding in a natural manner and
conditioned by the general natural laws. [LW, p. 112]
In other words, life (i.e., biological existence) is nothing more than one particular
aspect of nature, and, vice versa, nature alone generates the life principle without
outside guidance:
There is no such thing as dead nature; the difference between organic and
inorganic nature consists merely in the kind, direction, and intensity of
their motion. . . . The matter which is found in both, the natural forces
which operate in both, are the same; and, however intricate the characters
of life may be, they are neither more nor less than movements of matter
under peculiar and highly specialized conditions. [LW, p. 111]
In retrospect this seems the case if atomic and sub-atomic motion can be both
identified and differentiated from the generation of DNA and RNA understood
as a “specialized condition” essential to life. With the later discovery that all life
without exception depends on the involvement of DNA and RNA strands in the
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nucleus of all biological cells regardless of their level of evolutionary
advancement, there is little difficulty in distinguishing between spontaneous
behavior by creatures so endowed on a genetic basis and the visible cause-andeffect movement of strictly physical events such as waves, the wind, falling
rocks, expansion resulting from heat, etc.
Büchner took for granted that this secular perspective was shared if not
fully understood by most educated individuals, however small their number, by
the end of the nineteenth century. These “judicious few” [LW, p. 147]—as
opposed to the “ignorant multitude” who had been described by Hume as the
“common people,” by Tindal as the “bulk of mankind” and by Rousseau as the
“common herd”—fully recognized the potential absurdity of the God concept
and the need for a more cogent explanation among those able and willing to cope
with this realization. As an obvious compromise by the end of the nineteenth
century, most who belonged to this minority at odds with received orthodoxy,
identified themselves as “agnostics,” as proposed by Thomas Huxley with the
tentative support of his mentor, Charles Darwin. However, both of them as well
as most of their followers at the time refused to confront the choice between the
acceptance of the God concept and its rejection based on the secular adoption of
Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason that our universe has become totally
explicable devoid of godhead. Nevertheless, God’s presumably transcendent
role cannot be absolutely proven true or false, if on no other basis than Descartes’
suggestion of God as a “malicious demon” able and willing to obscure His
existence despite the best efforts of mankind to demonstrate otherwise. As
already indicated in Force and Matter, Büchner disdained such logic and
promoted outright atheism despite the concession that its truth had not yet been
completely demonstrated by science, as still remains to be seen relevant to such
issues as the origin of life.
It can be mentioned on a final ironic note that additional to his vigorous
authorship, Büchner helped to found in 1881 the Deutscher Freidenkerbund
(German League of Freethinkers) a wide network of German freethought
associations with a total membership in 1930 of between six and eight hundred
thousand. All of these associations were abruptly terminated as soon as Hitler
came to power in 1933, probably relevant to his successful effort to obtain the
combined Catholic and Protestant acceptance of his dictatorial powers. By 1938
Hitler could actually boast that more Germans had purchased Bibles that year
than copies of Mein Kampf. Atheism has certainly revived in Germany since then,
but not as a militant cause comparable to the support obtained by Büchner and
his followers preceding the turn of the twentieth century.
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